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CRIMINAL

LAW

When IsFailing to Advise
a Defendant of His Right
to Counsel Harmless Error?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 89-91. 0 2001 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of Law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis.;
or (414) 288-5377. He is a
co-author of West's Federal Jury
Practiceand Instructions (5th
ed.).

ISSUE
When should a district court's failure to advise a counseled defendant
at his guilty plea hearing that he has
the right to the assistance of counsel at trial be subject to plain-error,
rather than harmless-error, review?
FACTS
In February 1997 three men
entered a bank in Long Beach,
Calif., and attempted a daring robbery. Announcing "[tihis is a
holdup," two of the robbers drew
guns and instructed everyone to get
on the floor. The third man,
Alphonso Vonn, leaped over the
counter with a bag for the tellers to
fill with money. The three robbers
fled with a total of $209. A short
time later, the three robbers were
arrested and the police recovered
the money from Vonn's sock.
Vonn was charged with armed bank
robbery and chose to plead guilty.
At his guilty plea hearing, the court
informed Vonn of the rights he was
relinquishing by pleading guilty.
However, the court did not advise
him of his right to counsel at trial.

After Vonn pled guilty, the government filed a superseding indictment
charging Vonn with conspiracy to
commit bank robbery and carrying
a firearm during a crime of violence.
Vonn pled guilty to these additional
charges. Again, the judge failed to
inform Vonn of his right to an attorney at trial.
At this time, the government's attorney informed the court that it did
not "remember hearing the Court
inform the defendant of his right to
assistance of counsel." The judge
responded that he did do so because
Vonn was represented by counsel.
Vonn later moved to withdraw his
guilty plea on the firearm charge,
claiming that he was not guilty and
his plea was the result of a mistake.
The court denied Vonn's motion and
sentenced him to 97 months in
prison, to be followed by three
years' supervised release.
(Continued on Page 90)
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Vonn then appealed his conviction
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, asking the court to
set aside his convictions because of
the judge's failure to advise him of
his right to counsel at trial.
Reversing the district court, the
Ninth Circuit held that the district
court's failure, during its acceptance
of Vonn's guilty pleas, to advise him
of his right to counsel at trial was
not harmless error.
The Supreme Court granted the
government's petition for a writ of
certiorari, 121 S.Ct. 1185 (2001),
and it will now review the Ninth
Circuit's decision.
CASE ANALYSIS
According to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, before
accepting a guilty plea, "the court
must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the
defendant" of his rights. Rule 11
then lists the specific rights the
court must explain to the defendant.
These enumerated rights include
the right to representation by counsel at trial. Where a defendant's
Rule 11 rights are violated, the
defendant is typically allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Whenever a court determines an
error has occurred, however, the
court must decide whether it must
remedy the error. By their nature,
some errors so significantly affect
the entire structure of the proceeding that they must always be remedied. In these cases, there is no
need for any analysis of how the
error might have affected or not
affected the particular proceeding.
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279 (1991).
In McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459 (1969), the Supreme Court
held that a defendant is entitled to
plead anew if the district court
accepts the defendant's guilty plea

without fully adhering to the procedure provided in Rule 11. In 1985,
subsection (h) was added to Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to provide: "Harmless
Error. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which
does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded."
Normally, where an error is not
brought to the district court's attention before appeal, the "plain error"
rule applies. See Chapman v.
California,386 U.S. 18 (1967). Rule
52(b)of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure defines "plain
error" as "errors or defects affecting
substantial rights," and provides
that these "may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the court." See also United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725
(1993) (error is "plain error" only if
the error affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceeding).
If the "plain error" rule under Rule
52(b) applies to an unobjected-to
Rule 11 violation, then the defendant will bear the burden of establishing "prejudice" and must
demonstrate not only that he would
not have pleaded guilty in the
absence of the court's error, but also
that there is some reason to believe
that he would not have been convicted. If, on the other hand, "harmless error" under Rule 11(h) applies,
the government will bear the burden of establishing the lack of
prejudice.
The government argues that Vonn is
precluded from raising his Rule 11
claim because he failed to raise it in
the trial court when he moved to
withdraw his guilty pleas. According
to the government, the district
court's failure to adhere strictly to
the requirements of Rule 11 was
harmless error. Thus, the government asserts, Vonn is entitled to

relief only if he can show that the
court's action was "plain error"
within the meaning of Rule 52(b).
It is the government's position that
a showing of plain error in a guilty
plea colloquy requires a finding that
the error affected the outcome of
the proceeding. Vonn disagrees,
arguing that the district court's failure to advise him of his right to
counsel if he went to trial rendered
his guilty pleas unintelligent and
entitles him to have his guilty pleas
vacated.
According to Vonn, the "plain error"
rule in Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to
Rule 11 errors. Relying on the
"harmless error" rule in Rule 11(h),
Vonn asserts that a Rule 11 error
going to the essence of whether the
plea was voluntary and intelligent is
never harmless. He claims that Rule
11(h) was meant merely to prevent
the vacating of guilty pleas based on
violations that did not go to the voluntariness or intelligence of the
plea.
The government contends that
there is no basis in the text of Rule
11(h) to suggest that some subset of
Rule 11 errors may not be found
harmless. Pointing out that Rule
11(h) states that "[anyvariance
from the procedures required by
this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded
[emphasis added]," the government
says the court's duty to inform the
defendant of his right to counsel at
trial is one of the procedures
required by Rule 11 and is thus subject to harmless-error review.
According to Vonn, plain-error
review under Rule 52(b) is inappropriate when a guilty plea is unconstitutional. Although recognizing
that the provisions of Rule 11 are
not constitutional requirements,
Vonn claims that they are prophylactic rules meant to guarantee the

Issue No. 2

constitutional requirement that a
guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent. The government disagrees,
contending that the Supreme Court
has rejected the argument that the
procedures of Rule 11 are compelled
by the Constitution.
Vonn says it makes no sense in the
context of a voluntary and intelligent plea or the waiver of a constitutional right to hold him responsible for the inaction of his attorney.
He asserts that application of the
government's raise-or-forfeit rule to
a guilty plea colloquy would result
in the waiver of important constitutional rights by silence.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court has never
expressly addressed the applicability of plain-error review to Rule 11
violations, including those that go
directly to ensuring the plea is voluntary and intelligent. The 1985
amendment adding subsection (h)
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure was intended to
abrogate the Supreme Court's ruling
in McCarthy v. United States to
some extent. The Supreme Court is
now called upon to determine the
extent to which McCarthy has been
abrogated. The Supreme Court's
decision determining the allocation
of the burden of proof is important,
as the allocation of the burden will
often determine which side prevails.
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958).
A number of federal courts have
held that when the district court
was not asked to set aside a guilty
plea, appellate review will be for
plain error. See, e.g., United States
v. Gandia-Maysonet,227 F.3d 1
(1st Cir.2000); United States v.
Bashara,27 F.3d 11743 (6th
Cir.1994); United States v. Driver,
242 F.3d 767 (7th Cir.2001); United
States v. Young, 927 F.2d 1060 (8th
Cir.1991); and United States v.

American Bar Association

Quinones, 97 F.3d 473 (11th
Cir.1996). See also United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
Other circuits have disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit and held that a
defendant who is represented by
counsel at his plea hearing is presumed to be aware of his right to
counsel at trial. In United States v.
Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521
(10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit
held that there was no prejudice
resulting from the court's failure to
advise the defendant that he had a
right to counsel because the defendant was already represented by
counsel. See also United States v.
Caston, 615 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.
1980) (harmless error where court
failed to explicitly advise defendant
of right to assistance of counsel at
trial); United States v. Saft, 558
F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1977) (it would
defy reality to suppose that defendant had any doubts about his
appointed counsel's continuing to
represent him at trial because,
unlike a defendant with retained
counsel who might worry that his
money might run out, there was no
suggestion that defendant's counsel
would abandon him if he went to
trial).
The Seventh Circuit recently held
that a violation of the requirements
of Rule 11 is harmless and does not
provide a fair and just reason to
allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea
when the defendant already knew
the information omitted by the
judge. United States v. Driver, 242
F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2001).
A decision upholding the government's position would make it more
difficult for a defendant to withdraw
a guilty plea. Such a decision could
enable district courts to build a
record essential to understanding
the effect of any noncompliance
with Rule 11 and would permit district judges to take the guilty plea

anew and avoid the delay that
results from an appeal and that may
undermine the accuracy of any
ensuing trial.
On the other hand, a decision
upholding the Ninth Circuit's decision would provide further assurance that a defendant is aware of
his or her rights at the time they are
being waived in the course of pleading guilty. Such a decision would
ensure strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 11 in entertaining a defendant's plea of guilty.
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